by Deep Green Resistance News Service | Jan 6, 2017 | Strategy & Analysis
This is the eleventh installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
via Deep Green Resistance UK
Deep Green Resistance advocates for the sabotage of infrastructure. Some nonviolent advocates discuss the use of sabotage in relation to nonviolence.
In The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Gene Sharp does not classify the sabotage of property as violent, but states that sabotage could become violent if it causes injury or death. He considers that certain actions (including removal of key components, vehicle fuel, records or files) can fall somewhere between sabotage and nonviolent action. He describes that when nonviolent action has not been successful, sabotage has sometimes followed. Sharp does not describe any instances of sabotage being used by a disciplined nonviolent movement. In his view, sabotage is more closely related to violence than nonviolence, in terms of principles, strategy, and mechanisms of operation. [1]
Sharp also lists nine reasons why sabotage will seriously weaken a nonviolent movement:
- it risks unintentional physical injury;
- it may result in the use of “violence” or the use of force against those who discover plans of sabotage;
- it requires secrecy in planning and carrying out missions, which also may result in “violence” or the use of force if discovered;
- it only requires a few resisters, which reduces large scale participation;
- it demonstrates a lack of confidence in nonviolent actions;
- it relies on physical destruction rather than people challenging each other directly;
- sabotage and nonviolence are rooted in very different strategies—nonviolence in withdrawal of consent, sabotage in destroying property;
- if any physical injury or death happens, even if by accident, it will result in a loss of support for the nonviolent cause;
- sabotage may cause increased repression. [2]
Ackerman and Kruegler agree with Sharp and recommend avoiding sabotage and demolition, but they do identify “nonviolent sabotage” as a form of economic subversion that renders resources for repression inoperative by removing components, overloading systems and jamming electronics. [3]
Branagan differentiates nonviolent property damage and sabotage. Property damage that occurs during a nonviolent action may involve, for example, a hole in the road that has minimum impact, especially compared to ecological, structural, cultural or physical violence. In his model, sabotage is defined by conducting sustained systematic attacks on property, and then getting away with it. [4]
Bill Meyers describes that sabotage was the primary tactics used by Earth First! in the US in 1989. However, during this period nonviolence activists joined the group, arguing that sabotage is a form of violence that feeds a cycle by giving those sabotaged the excuse for their own violence. They also conflated property destruction with violence against persons. Meyers explains that by 1990, this shift in participants’ ideological stances regarding violence resulted in the transition of Earth First! from a revolutionary group that was a genuine threat to the corporations destroying the earth into a much less physically threatening group.
To conclude this run of articles, over the last seven posts I’ve attempted to: define nonviolence and pacifism; explain what nonviolent resistance is; describe its advantages; signpost you to where you can learn more about struggles and who is advocating for nonviolent resistance; and finally how nonviolence and sabotage fit together.
Pacifism is clearly based on good intentions and an understandable desire for a world at peace. Nonviolent resistance is a very important tactic in our struggle. But crucially, it can not be the only tactic if the movement for environmental and social justice ever hopes to be effective. If the planet is to remain livable in the medium term then the movement needs to determine which tactics are most likely to succeed. Regardless of the differences of opinion and focus within the movement, the movement as well as the planet are losing. Being wedded to mostly nonviolent tactics is a major cause of this failure.
Strategic nonviolence has an important part to play in our resistance but the need for some nonviolent advocates to only advocate pacifism or nonviolent resistance in any circumstances and try to mandate it across whole movements, is counterproductive and causing the movement to be less effective.
An act of sabotage or property destruction is violent or nonviolent depending on the intentions and the way they are carried out (see post 4). I don’t think that sabotage or property destruction of nonliving things such as buildings, vehicles, and infrastructure in the defence of life can ever be considered violent.
In the next run of posts I will explore the problems with nonviolence and pacifism.
This is the eleventh installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
Endnotes
- Politics of Nonviolent Action, Gene Sharp, 1973, page 608/9
- Politics of Nonviolent Action, page 609/10
- Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century, Peter Ackerman and Chris Kruegler, 1993, page 39
- Global Warming: Militarism and Nonviolence,The Art of Active Resistance, Marty Branagan, 2013, page 124
by Deep Green Resistance News Service | Dec 28, 2016 | Strategy & Analysis
This is the tenth installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
via Deep Green Resistance UK
The aim of this post is to inform those interested in researching how to strategically confront the state using nonviolent direct action or force; and how this information might be applied to their situation.
Two books describe and analyse a number of struggles. In Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, [1] Ackerman and Kruegler analyse a number of nonviolent conflicts based on their Twelve Principles of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, which I described in a previous post. The conflicts include: the First Russian Revolution 1904-1906; Ruhrkampf regional defense against occupation, 1923; the Indian Independence Movement, 1930-1931; Denmark occupation and resistance, 1940-1945; El Salvador civic strike, 1944; Resistance against the Polish Communist Party, 1980-1981.
In The Failure of Nonviolence, [2] Gelderloos describes and analyses over thirty nonviolent and militant struggles, which have occurred since the end of the cold war. He uses a four point criteria: whether a movement seized space for new social relations; whether it spread an awareness of new ideas (and secondarily if this awareness was passive or whether it inspired others to fight); whether it had elite support; whether it achieved any concrete gains in improving people’s lives.
The struggles he lists are: The Oka Crisis, The Zapatistas, The Pro-Democracy Movement in Indonesia, The Second Intifada, The Black Spring in Kabylie, The Corralito (in Argentina), the Day the World Said No to War, The Colour Revolution, Kuwait’s “Blue Revolution” and Lebanon’s “Cedar Revolution,” The 2005 Banlieue Uprisings, Bolivia’s Water War and Gas War, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution, The Oaxaca Rebellion, The 2006 CPE Protests, 2007 Saffron Revolution, The 2008 insurrection in Greece, Bersih Rallies, Guadeloupe General Strike, UK Student Movement, Tunisian Revolution, The Egyptian Revolution of 2011, The Libyan Civil War, The Syrian Civil War, 15M Movement and General Strikes, 2001 United Kingdom Anti-Austerity Protests, 2011 England riots, Occupy, The 2011-2013 Chile student protests, The Quebec Student Movement, and The Mapuche struggle.
The Global Nonviolent Action Database is also an online resources with some 1,000 examples of nonviolent actions.
Gelderloos also offers a very comprehensive list of those individuals advocating for pacifism and nonviolence. [3] Other organizations active in this realm include: the Albert Einstein Institution; the International Centre on Nonviolent Conflict, the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, Waging Nonviolence and Campaign Nonviolence.
The Radical Think Tank in London has been researching the ways in which nonviolent direct action could be used in the UK. Its members have identified three key mechanisms to enhance political participation and mobilisation to increase the campaign’s likelihood of success: (1) the conditional commitment or pledges; (2) dilemma actions, a lose-lose situation for the authorities; and (3) fostering open space, where people can talk freely about what’s bothering them, which is empowering and motivates them to act. They have also mapped out a number of hypothetical campaign progressions which combine all three mechanisms in order to show how much more effective they can be when combined.
This is the tenth installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
Endnotes
- Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century, Peter Ackerman and Chris Kruegler, 1993
- Failure of Nonviolence, Peter Gelderloos, 2013, page 48-97
- Failure of Nonviolence, page 160-215
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by Deep Green Resistance News Service | Dec 19, 2016 | Strategy & Analysis
This is the ninth installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
via Deep Green Resistance UK
Advocates of nonviolent methods argue that their approach holds a number of advantages over using force.
One argument often made is that “violence” or the use of force weakens the movement, that it shifts attention to this form of resistance and away from the issues at stake. Some also argue that the use of “violent” means or force can give the government the excuse it needs to use violence against the movement. [1]
Gene Sharp argues that using nonviolent methods or “weapon systems” unfamiliar to police and military increases the activists’ total combat effectiveness. According to Sharp, any state repression against the nonviolent movement would expose state violence in the worst possible light, and shift public opinion and power relations towards the nonviolent group. In this way, organizers of nonviolent actions aim to cut off the sources of a regime’s power—one being its capacity for violence—rather than to attack the resources and the infrastructure produced by that power. Sharp considers that, in a sense, this may constitute a more direct attack on the opponent than could be achieved with “violence” or the use of force [2].
Marty Branagan contends that nonviolent actions have resulted in extraordinary achievements, are ethically superior, and are more effective. He also argues that nonviolence replaces the win/lose power play, which leads to a physical, legal and psychological response, with a win/win solution of cooperation. Nonviolent methods also avoid the long-term inter-generational hatred caused by “violence” or force. Branagan cites several studies that indicate that nonviolent struggles result in governments that better observe democratic rights. [3]
Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan conducted a statistical analysis of the effectiveness of nonviolence by compiling 323 major nonviolent campaigns between 1900 to 2006 and subjectively rating them as “successful,” “partially successful,” or “failed.” [4] However, the rating of reformist movements as successful, for example, do not use a revolutionary criteria. [5] I’ll explore the issues with this study in a future post.
Ackerman and Kruegler write that most nonviolent methods are chosen because they are the most effective and least costly means available, and that nonviolent action is often chosen because a military response is not an option. [6]
Mike Ryan describes two distinct arguments that support adherence to nonviolence: the ideological argument and the practical argument. Ideologically, nonviolence is seen as good/right and violence is bad. Practically, it is argued that it’s not the right time for violence; it alienates the people; it results in repression; and it will result in unfavorable press. [7]
This is the ninth installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
Endnotes
- Politics of Nonviolent Action, Gene Sharp, 1973, page 597
- Politics of Nonviolent Action, page 453/4
- Global Warming: Militarism and Nonviolence,The Art of Active Resistance, Marty Branagan, 2013, page 58
- Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, 2012
- Failure of Nonviolence, Peter Gelderloos, 2015, page 42-6
- Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century, Peter Ackerman and Chris Kruegler, 1993, page 4
- Pacifism as Pathology, Ward Churchill, 1998, page 126/7
by Deep Green Resistance News Service | Dec 17, 2016 | Strategy & Analysis
This is the eighth installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
via Deep Green Resistance UK
Srdja Popovic, one of the organisers of Otpor, the nonviolent group that challenged Slobodon Milosevic in Serbia, now offers nonviolence training through the The Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS). Popovic views a nonviolent campaign as a war, but one which is fought with different kinds of weapons or sanctions. [1] He argues that a successful nonviolent struggle requires nonviolent discipline, unity, and planning. [2] He points out that the state employs fear and the threat of arrest or more terrifying repercussions to make the people obey:
All oppression relies on fear in order to be effective…the ultimate point of all this fear is not merely to make you afraid. A dictator isn’t interested in running a haunted house. Instead, he wants to make you obey. And when it comes down to it, whether or not you obey is always your choice. Let’s say that you wake up in some nightmare scenario out of a mafia movie, where some wacko tries to force you to dig a ditch. They put a gun to your head and threaten to kill you if you don’t start shoveling. Now, they certainly have the power to scare you, and it’s certainly not easy to argue with someone who has a pistol pointed right at your temple. But can anybody really make you do something? Nope. Only you can decide whether or not to dig that ditch. You are totally free to say no. The punishment will certainly be severe, but it’s still your choice to decline. And, if you absolutely refuse to pick up that shovel and they shoot you dead, you still haven’t dug them a ditch. So the point of oppression and fear isn’t to force you to do something against your will – which is impossible – but rather to make you obey. That’s where they get you. [3]
Popovic then explains that once those involved with Otpor moved past the fear of the unknown—and of being arrested—they were able to blunt the state’s oppressive power:
The best way to overcome the fear of the unknown is with knowledge. From the earliest days of Otpor!, one of the most effective tools the police had against us was the threat of arrest. Notice I didn’t say arrest but just the threat of it. The threat was much more effective than the thing itself, because before we actually started getting arrested by Milošević’s police, we didn’t know what jails were like, and because people are normally much more afraid of the unknown, we imagined Milošević’s prisons to be the worst kind of hell…But then when things started getting heated, a lot of us actually were arrested, and when we got back we told the others all about it. We left out none of the details. We wrote down and shared with our fellow revolutionaries every bit of what had happened in the jails. We wanted those about to get arrested themselves – we knew there were bound to be many, many more of us picked up by the dictator’s goons – to understand every step of what was going to happen to them. [4]
While this reasoning may not be appropriate in all socio-political contexts (such as for survivors of rape, assault, domestic abuse, and hate crime), it’s useful as a real world example of the power of knowledge in organizing a movement.
He explains that in order for the average citizen to really engage with an issue, they need to believe something to be unfair or wrong. [5] Like Sharp, Popovic believes that “in a nonviolent struggle, the only weapon that you’re going to have is numbers.” [6] Nonviolent struggles try to win by converting people to the cause. Following this reasoning, Popovic advocates that a nonviolent campaign be relatable to arouse the sympathy of the masses. [7]
Author Tim Gee writes in Counterpower: Making Change Happen, that power is “the ability for A to get B to do something that B would not otherwise have done,” and that “if the interests of those in power are not threatened…the likelihood of rulers voluntarily giving up power altogether is small.” [8] Gee proposes a strategic approach he calls “counterpower, which turns traditional notions of power on their head. Counterpower is the ability of B to remove the power of A.”
The concept of counterpower involves challenging accepted truths or refusing to obey. Economic counterpower can be exercised through strikes and boycotts. Physical counterpower can mean fighting back or nonviolently utilizing human bodies to disrupt, stall, or permanently end the perpetration of injustices. [9] Gee goes on to describe four stages to a successful campaign: consciousness, coordination, confrontation, and consolidation. [10]
Mike Ryan makes the astute observation in Pacifism as Pathology that writers from the 1800s did not state that nonviolence means the “absolute, constant and permanent absence of force or violence.” Doug Man’s “The Movement” and Pat James’ “Physical Resistance to Attack: The Pacifist’s Dilemma, the Feminist’s Hope” argue that it’s important to use the least forceful response that is appropriate to that situation, rather than not using force under any circumstances.
If Man’s and James’ view on the acceptable level of violence were adopted by nonviolence movements today, then the ideological distance between nonviolent resisters and advocates of violent resistance would stem more from differences in analysis and choice of tactics, rather than the current focus on what’s moral or strategic. [11]
This is the eighth installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
Endnotes
- Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Non-Violent Techniques to Galvanise Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World, Srdja Popovic, Matthew Miller, 2015, page 88
- Blueprint for Revolution, page 213
- Blueprint for Revolution, page 130
- Blueprint for Revolution, page 131
- Blueprint for Revolution, page 143
- Politics of Nonviolent Action, Gene Sharp, 1973, page 52
- Blueprint for Revolution, page 204
- Counterpower Why Movements Succeed and Fail, Gee, Tim, 2011, page 200
- Counterpower, page 13
- Counterpower, page 130
- Pacifism as Pathology, Ward Churchill, 1998, page 136
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by Deep Green Resistance News Service | Dec 14, 2016 | Strategy & Analysis
This is the seventh installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
via Deep Green Resistance UK
Lierre Keith, author of Deep Green Resistance, has very clear views on
using nonviolent direct action. These views have been strongly influenced by Gene Sharp’s work. She states that the first question activists must answer is whether the political system they seek to change needs to be adjusted inside a basically sound institutional framework, or whether it requires more fundamental change. If the political system requires fundamental change, such change cannot be achieved by compromise or persuasion; it necessitates some kind of struggle that inherently involves conflict. Those who believe such institutions to be sound will “keep banging their head[s] against these institutions but the institutions will not yield to their fundamental principles.”
Keith points out that neither engagement in a struggle nor the use of force necessitates violence. At this stage the question of whether to use force or nonviolent tactics is premature; decisions about tactics come later.
Keith is critical of the liberal notion of consent, as she does not consider consent to be freely given. Consent is extracted from the ruled either ideologically or by terror and force. Therefore, the whole function of power is to extract consent. In Keith’s view, consent is actually a euphemism for submission. She explains how most of us don’t want to be forced to consent or submit, we want to be fully informed people who have actual choices to control the material conditions of our lives. We do not want to be given choices within such limited conditions; we want to actually control the conditions, so that our choices are choices in a meaningful sense. Keith states that, as a group, we can choose to remove our consent from the systems of power or not. If it is agreed that we wish to remove our consent, the question becomes: how best to do that? How best to get people to understand that they can remove their consent, and then, how to organise that withdrawal so the systems crumble?
Keith describes how nonviolent direct action impinges on the state’s power more directly than using force, because their power comes from the population. For Keith this is the important insight into why this technique works. When the population takes back their political, economic, and social power from the state then “the state is left with nothing.” Withdrawing power does not work if just done emotionally, and that this is where many on the left have gone wrong.
Another important point Keith makes is that nonviolent resistance to power makes visible the repression and structural violence of the system. Therefore, for a nonviolent campaign to work, those involved must maintain nonviolent discipline. Keith explains that such commitment is crucial to the success of this strategy because it reveals the violent overreaction of those in power. If the movement reacts with force, it will look like a riot to those observing (or those sitting on the sidelines trying to work out which side to join), and it will be difficult to distinguish between the violence of the state and the self-defense of the activists. Such a situation demonstrates how a diversity of tactics can be problematic – it can cause the movement to be viewed negatively and therefore make it less effective. Diversity of tactics does have a part to play in our struggle, but timing is important. I will discuss this topic more in a future post.
Keith is clear that verbally appealing to or begging the powerful for some kind of conciliation is not nonviolent direct action; it is a verbal appeal or a conciliatory effort. She states that these actions do not actually confront power but are merely a rational or emotional appeal. Nonviolent direct action doesn’t work because it is morally or spiritually superior, it works because it:
- exposes the violence of the state and demystifies power
- breaks through the psychology of the oppressed
- ultimately removes the support on which the powerful depend
Keith concludes that nonviolent direct action can work, but when determining our tactics we must always ask these key questions: is it going to work for the struggle we are in? Do we have enough people and time? It takes a lot of people and time to learn from the mistakes of initially using nonviolent direct action to get to a point when a movement can use it effectively. [1]
In Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, Ackerman and Kruegler argue that having a strategy and applying it properly are the most important factors determining the outcome of a nonviolent conflict.
They define strategy in this overarching sense as “a process by which one analyses a given conflict and determines how to gain objectives at minimum expense and risk.” [2] They also explain that “strategic performance is likely to be a significant, possibly the dominant, factor in the outcome of nonviolent struggle.” [3]
Ackerman and Kruegler also state the need to distinguish between policy, strategy, and tactics when addressing a conflict. Within this framework, “policy” consists of the objectives that define an acceptable outcome, and will therefore determine when the activists stop fighting. Strategy, in this more focused sense, is the plan for achieving the objectives, which may need to adapt to the group circumstances. Tactical decisions are related to how to initiate or respond to interactions with the opponent. [4] Ackerman and Kruegler identify twelve principles of strategic nonviolent conflict. [5]
Twelve Principles of Strategic Nonviolent Conflict
Principles of Development
1. Formulate functional objectives.
2. Develop organizational strength.
3. Secure access to critical material resources.
4. Cultivate external assistance.
5. Expand the repertoire of sanctions.
Principles of Engagement
6. Attack the opponent’s strategy for consolidating control.
7. Mute the impact of the opponents’ violent weapons.
8. Alienate opponents from expected bases of support.
9. Maintain nonviolent discipline.
Principles of Conception
10. Assess events and options in light of levels of strategic
decision making.
11. Adjust offensive and defensive operations according to the relative vulnerabilities of the protagonists.
12. Sustain continuity between sanctions, mechanisms, and objectives.
This is the seventh installment in a multi-part series. Browse the Protective Use of Force index to read more.
Endnotes
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G2gRtXp3qp8
- Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century, Peter Ackerman and Chris Kruegler, 1993, page 6
- Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, page 2
- Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, page 7
- Strategic Nonviolent Conflict, page 21 and read online
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